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I E S ETHE  ORGANIZATIONAL  TENSION  BETWEEN  STATIC  AND
DYNAMIC  EFFICIENCY
Abstract
Efficiency has been defined in at least two different ways: in terms of the refinement
of existing products, processes or capabilities (static efficiency) and as the development of
new ones (dynamic efficiency). This paper analyzes the organizational trade-off between
these two forms of efficiency. It shows that there is a tendency towards extremes, and that the
irreversibility of efficiency orientations tends to tip the balance to be struck between static
and dynamic efficiency toward the latter. The paper also advances hypotheses about industry,
business and corporate factors that mediate between the choice of a particular efficiency
orientation and organizational performance.
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Ghemawat's research was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School.THE  ORGANIZATIONAL  TENSION  BETWEEN  STATIC  AND
DYNAMIC  EFFICIENCY
This paper builds on the growing literature on the firm as an information-
processing entity.  It focuses on a basic tension in processing information: using it to search
for improvements within a framework of fixed beliefs about how the environment behaves
and responds to organizational actions versus using it to reconsider the beliefs themselves.
Implicit in this tension are two understandings of efficiency (or actually, efficiency-oriented
search processes): static efficiency, which involves continuous search for improvements
within a fixed set of initial conditions, and dynamic efficiency, which involves continuous
reconsideration of initial conditions.
In this paper, we seek to advance the analysis of the trade-off between static
and dynamic efficiency.  Section 1 touches upon some related literature.  Section 2 models
the single-period allocation of a fixed information-processing resource between the
imperatives of static and dynamic efficiency and relates the model’s identification of a
possible tendency toward extremes –toward an exclusive focus on either static or dynamic
efficiency– to practical considerations.  Section 3 analyzes a multi-period extension of the
basic model and emphasizes that, in most circunstances, once a commitment is made to a
particular efficiency orientation, this tends to tip optima toward dynamic efficiency relative to
the single-period benchmark. Section 4 sketches some hypotheses about how the
performance of an organization of a particular type may be affected by its industry
environment and strategic choices.  Section 5 concludes.
1. Some related literature
The distinction between static and dynamic efficiency has not passed
unnoticed.  We cite just a few prominent sightings here and apologize in advance to the
authors of other important studies which are omitted. The distinction between static and
dynamic efficiency is evident in Ashby’s [1956] seminal work on systems analysis, which
distinguishes between a single-loop system, rather like a thermostat, which adjusts to
environmental changes in preprogrammed ways, and a more complicated double-loop
system, in which the lower-level feedback loop can be reprogrammed by a second, higher-
level loop.  In organization theory, Burns and Stalker [1961] crystallize similar considerations
into two ideal organizational types, mechanistic and organic, that are suited to stable and
changing environments respectively; and Argyris and Schon [1974] distinguish between
single-loop and double-loop organizational learning in a way that evokes Ashby’s loops and
influences our definitions of the two types of efficiency.In technology and operations management, the distinction between static and
dynamic efficiency is implicit in Abernathy’s [1978] productivity dilemma: the idea that a
productive unit cannot be both highly efficient (in a static sense) and support a high rate of
innovation.  In terms of strategic management, and from a more pedagogical perspective, it is
worth noting that until quite recently an important linchpin of the strategy formulation-
implementation sequence at the Harvard Business School was a note that emphasized the
distinction between “Type A” organizations, developed for current efficiency and regularity,
and “Type B” organizations, developed for innovation and flexibility (Heskett [1987]).
The distinction between static and dynamic efficiency has also been examined by
economists, mostly under the heading of flexibility. We discuss their work in slightly more
detail because of its connections to our own. Stigler [1939] and Hart [1942] initiated
economic research in this area by analyzing the cost penalties incurred in adapting production
technologies to changes in demand by adjusting output levels, an inverse measure of
flexibility.  Marschak and Nelson [1962] broadened the analysis to consider adaptation to all
forms of environmental turbulence, not just to changes in demand. Jones and Ostroy [1984]
apply option-theoretic concepts to analyze the value of flexibility. The two most interesting
economic treatments for our purposes, however, are those of Klein [1984] and Carlsson
[1989].
Klein [1984] begins by distinguishing between static and dynamic efficiency,
defining the former as “fine-tuning whose objective is to make the best use of existing
information” (p. 50). In other words, he defines static efficiency as the optimal combination
of given inputs, subject to the constraints imposed by a fixed production function. Dynamic
efficiency, in contrast, is defined as “changing the production function in profitable
directions” (p. 46). Klein goes on to differentiate dynamic efficiency into two types of
flexibility (p. 47). Type I flexibility is associated with anticipated uncertainty (or “risk” in the
sense of Knight [1921]) and is “built into production processes so they can produce quite
dissimilar existing products on the same production line... It is aimed at rapid short-term
response to changes in market conditions by permitting very significant shifts in the
composition of output without the usual penalties involved in closing down entire production
lines.”  Type II flexibility, in contrast, is associated with unanticipated uncertainty (“true”
Knightian uncertainty) and “is concerned with the ability to make good use of newly
disclosed opportunities, be they opportunities for improving the production process or
developing and producing new products”.
Carlsson [1989] builds on Klein’s work but comes up with a somewhat different
scheme for classifying flexibility: into its operational, tactical and strategic aspects.
Operational flexibility is associated with the short run and is defined as “built-in procedures
which permit a high degree of variation in sequencing, scheduling, etc.” (p. 47). Tactical
flexibility is associated with the medium run and “is built into the technology, i.e., the
organization and the production equipment, of the firm and enables it to deal e.g. with
changes in the rate of production or in product mix over the course of the business cycle, as
well as moderate changes in design.”  Finally, strategic flexibility is associated with the long
run and “reflects how the firm positions itself with respect to a menu of choices for the
future”.  Although Klein’s and Carlsson’s classification schemes are obviously related to each
other, it should be noted that they have different bases: the type of uncertainty and the length
of the time horizon, respectively. 
We shall offer our own definitions of what we mean by orientations toward static
and dynamic efficiency in the next section and in the context of a specific model. What needs
to be explained here are the ways in which our definitions differ from Klein’s and Carlsson’s,
2and why.  To focus on Klein’s definitions, we regard his intermediate category, Type I
flexibility, as basically a hybrid (or convex combination) of his two polar ones and reduce his
three categories to two: static efficiency and dynamic efficiency (where our definition of
dynamic efficiency corresponds most closely to his definition of Type II flexibility).  Second,
we are attracted to a basis of classification, learning, that is different from Klein’s (type of
uncertainty) and Carlsson’s (time horizon) because it emphasizes the influence
of organizational choices instead of largely exogenous environmental attributes.
The literature on organizational learning has a long and distinguished pedigree (e.g.,
March and Olsen [1976]).  The most helpful part of it for present purposes is Argyris and
Schon’s [1974] distinction, referred to earlier, between single- and double-loop learning.
Single-loop learning evokes Ashby’s thermostat and involves the adaptation of actions in
response to discrepancies between intentions and outcomes but within a given framework of
beliefs.  Double-loop learning, in contrast, also involves “going meta” on those beliefs by
reconsidering them.
Single- and double-loop learning have affinities with our definitions of static and
dynamic efficiency respectively. Once again, however, the correspondence is approximate
rather than exact.  Argyris and Schon [1974] appear to imply that double-loop learning is
always superior to single-loop learning. We think that that proposition should be probed, not
postulated. More specifically, we see a tension between the two feedback loops involved in
double-loop learning: one takes initial conditions to be fixed while the other focuses on
changes in initial conditions. The two loops differ in their temporal emphases, so that
temporally distinct choices about what to do effectively alter the weights attached to them.
Alternatively, information processing involves assigning relative weights to two distinct
inferential processes, one concerning possible improvements within the current framework of
beliefs and the other concerning the way those beliefs might usefully be revised in light of the
data. The next section examines this weighting problem in the context of a simple one-period
model.
2. A one-period model
The simple model presented in this section supplies a language for discussing static
and dynamic efficiency and analyses the trade-off between the two. The analysis indicates the
possibility of a tendency toward extremes: toward a focus on either static or dynamic
efficiency.  Practical considerations appear to increase the probability of such extreme
possibilities.
2.1. Assumptions
Our model of organizational information processing assumes optimization and
therefore abstracts away from the fact that organizations’ information-processing capabilities
are rarely the outcome of completely rational choice processes (e.g., March and Simon
[1958], Cyert and March [1963]). The assumption of optimization helps focus attention on
the pure incentives for learning. It also implies that the organization can be treated as
operating on the efficiency frontier. Note that the trade-off between static and dynamic
efficiency which we analyze need not apply to an organization that operates well within the
efficiency frontier.
3The state of the world in period t is represented as an unknown random variable
called   .  The state of the world changes from period 0 to period 1 according to the
following process:
(1)
where l Î [0,1], with extreme values corresponding to a random environment ( = 0) and a
stable one ( = 1).  The initial state, , and the change factor, , are assumed to be
independent random variables drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and variance
.  These assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity and could, to some degree, be
relaxed.  For example, most of the results that follow would also hold for change processes
that are martingales:
where  Similarly,  and  can have different means and variances as long as
they are independent of each other.
The information structure of the model comes next. We posit that the organization
has a fixed resource, say attention, to be allocated between learning about the initial state 
and the change factor  .  We assume that the organization allocates attention by choosing a
variable x Î [0,1] and then observing noisy signals  of  , with the variances of




where  are independently, identically and normally distributed with means and
variances of, respectively,  and  , and  decreases with x and 
increases with x.  The organization places an extreme emphasis on static efficiency if it
chooses x = 1 (so that most of its learning is about the initial state) and a similarly extreme
emphasis on dynamic efficiency if it chooses x = 0 (so that most of its learning is about the
change factor).
The organization’s objective function is kept simple. Its profits are assumed to be
given by
(3)
where  is the organization’s estimate of  and  is a random variable such that  is
totally uninformative about the state of the world.  This assumption, which can be relaxed to
a degree, highlights the causal ambiguity of performance outcomes, although its principal
purpose is to let us treat the signals, and  , as sufficient statistics.  The organization’s
objective can then be boiled down to forming the best estimate of the state of the world in
order to minimize the squared error term in equation (3).
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42.2. Analysis
Based on the preceding assumptions, the best estimate of the state of the world is
and the organization should choose x to minimize the following variance term:
Var | (4)
where and represent the posterior variances of  and respectively.
Given our normal prior and our normal signals, the posterior distribution of
is normal with mean and variance  . Similar expressions
can be derived for the posterior distribution of  (Cyert and DeGroot [1987], p. 18.).
Therefore, the posterior variances can be written as:
, (5a)
, (5b)
and the corresponding derivatives are  and  .
Then the derivative of the variance term in equation (4) is equal to:
. (6)
For compactness, define the terms
(7a)
(7b)
The first-order conditions for optimization can be written in these terms as:
(a) If z(x) ³ F( ) for all x  [0,1] then x* = 0.
(b) If z(x) ≤ F( ) for all x  [0,1] then x* = 1.
(c) Otherwise, there is a x*  (0,1) such that z(x*) = F( ).
It is easy to show that F( ) increases strictly, from 0 to ∞ , as  increases from 0
to 1.Furthermore, provided that the variances as functions of x are sufficiently well behaved,
z(x) is bounded in [0,1] by  and  , from below and above respectively, where  < ∞ and z
> 0.  Given that F(.) is strictly increasing, we can solve F( ) = z for any z, getting
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5(a) For all  for all x Î [0,1] and x* = 0.
(b) For all  for all x Î [0,1] and x* = 1.
(c) For any other , there is an x* Î (0,1) such that z(x*) = F( ).
This result is illustrated in Figure 1, which assumes that  = 0.5 and  = 1.5
(implying that the critical values of  are 0.41 and 0.55).  There is a tendency to “locate” at
extremes, i.e., to emphasize either static efficiency (x* = 1) or dynamic efficiency (x*= 0).
These extreme locations are always present whatever the shape of z(x) because that function
is always bounded.
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x* = 0 x* = 1Restore parametric generality but consider a special case in which the prior
distribution, N(µ, ), is very diffuse, so that the firm can forget about the prior and use only
the observations.  The special case corresponds to the limit as the variance  tends to ∞ . The
posterior distributions of and become, respectively, and .  As
a result, z(x) reduces to the absolute value of the ratio of derivatives of the corresponding
variances:
(8)
When z(x) is constant for all x  [0,1], both variances are linear functions of x.
Then there is a critical value, , such that for any <  *, x* = 0, and for
any  >  *, x* = 1.1
2.3. Discussion
Knowing that there are always values of  low or high enough to force extreme
solutions does not tell us anything about the actual incidence of such extremes.  Practical
considerations suggest, nonetheless, that these extreme possibilities should be taken
seriously.  This subsection discusses why.
The argument, baldly put, is that organizational arrangements that promote static
efficiency may be inconsistent with arrangements that promote dynamic efficiency.  The
argument works at two levels.  First, the pursuit of the two kinds of efficiency may not be
consistent in its implications for individual organizational elements.  Second, the requirement
of consistency across individual organizational elements may reinforce the tension, forcing
organizations to cluster into two relatively distinct archetypes (corresponding to x* equal to 0
or to 1).
An organizational element that illustrates these points particularly well is the
structure of decision rights within an organization.  A key concern in defining decision rights
is the trade-off between the information or knowledge problem and the control problem
(Jensen and Meckling [1992]). There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand, one might
decentralize decisions in an attempt to harness idiosyncratic knowledge in different parts of
the organization. This creates a control problem, however, because of the self-interest of the
agents to whom decisions are delegated. Second, one might centralize decision-making in the
belief that such idiosyncratic knowledge is not very relevant and that other specialized
knowledge can be transmitted at low cost.  Centralization solves the control problem at the
expense of an information problem.
These decision structures have very different implications for the way organizations
interact with their environment and therefore map differently onto our conceptions of static
and dynamic efficiency. A control-driven organization with its top-down decision processes
is likely to be better suited to the pursuit of static efficiency: after all, its managers prespecify
the learning paths to be pursued. A knowledge-driven organization, in contrast, is likely to be
comparatively well suited to the pursuit of dynamic efficiency because of its bottom-up
emphasis on surfacing new opportunities: its managers may make some top-down plans but




l l l* = z /( 1+ z)
Î
z (x)=v 'a(x)/(-v'e(x)).
N(d1,va(x)) N(s1,ve(x)) d q
v
v
7Similar arguments can be made regarding specific choices about other organizational
elements (e.g., objective versus subjective performance incentives).  Table 1 reproduces, as
an extensive-form illustration, the elements listed in the Harvard Business School note cited
earlier (Heskett [1987]).2  Although individual readers are likely to disagree with at least
some of the characterizations in Table 1, its columnar structure suggests a second reason why
organizations may, in terms of their efficiency orientations, cluster into two relatively distinct
archetypes: in order to harness complementarities among choices concerning individual
organizational elements.  To the extent that it is hard or at least costly to “mix and match”
across the two columns in Table 1 (or two columns that the reader might devise), that
increases the amount of clustering to be expected at the extremes compared with what a
simple row-by-row assessment might appear to indicate.
Table 1. Aligning elements of strategy
Summary of Type A Strategy Summary of Type B Strategy
developed for Current Efficiency developed for Innovation and
Resources and Regularity Flexibility
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Human Emphasis on quality of compliance and Emphasis on quality of originality and  
commitment commitment
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Financial Growth financed largely from ongoing Significant development investment  
business requiring financial capacity
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Technological Emphasis on incremental product  Emphasis on the development of entirely 
and process improvements new products and basic new technologies
Organization
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Structure Centralized/functional orientation Decentralized/product  orientation
Clear vertical chain of authority for  Network of influence and communication
decisions/communication Utilize projects and task forces
Sales and/or operations the dominant Marketing and/or R&D the dominant 
functions functions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Controls Tight, detailed plans and budgets Loose planning around objectives
Reviews at short intervals (management by objectives)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Standards Specific individual or group targets General targets
Compete with internal comparisons Compete with external comparisons
“Stretch” goals defined in terms of sales or  “Stretch” goals defined in terms of project 
production levels delivery dates
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rewards Tie rewards to individual or  group Tie rewards to total business performance 
performance Promote for innovative results
Promote for making plans Reward risk-takers with “soft landing” 
for failure
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Policies/ Top-down decision process Bottom-up and top-down decision processes
Processes Establish clear career tracks Use a clear “maze”
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Working  Pride in military precision Pride in being first with bright ideas
Environment Emphasis on making your numbers Emphasis on creative teamwork 
in terms of costs, delivery and quality Working hours and dress to meet individual
Standard working hours and dress preferences
Source:  Excerpted from Heskett [1987].
8While these arguments are informal, the mechanism they invoke can be illustrated
by modifying the basic model presented earlier in this section to include complexity costs,
costs that are higher for intermediate values of x than for extreme ones. Such complexity
costs generalize the idea that it is strictly infeasible to combine organizational elements in
particular ways: they imply that “mixing and matching” may be feasible but costly. We
aggregate the various sources of complexity costs into the differentiable function c(x), and
assume that the function is minimized at x = 0 and x = 1 and is single-peaked in between.  In
the presence of such costs, the organization’s optimization problem becomes one of
minimizing the following term:
(9)
The derivative with respect to x can be written as
(10)
Comparison of expressions (6) and (10) suggests that since c’(x) > 0 for small values
of x, complexity costs will expand the domain of  over which x* should be set to 0.
Similarly, since c’(x) < 0 for large values of x (close to 1), they also expand the domain of 
over which x should be set to 1.
To conclude this section, we have highlighted the probability of extreme possibilities
because of a sense that such nonconvexities are characteristic of strategy.3 The idea of
making trade-offs at the margin –in this case, between specialization in an initial state of the
world and the flexibility to adapt to changes in the initial state– is not very new.  The idea
that deserves additional emphasis is that organizations may need to do more than make
marginal trade-offs: nonconvexities may nudge them to choose between distinct
organizational archetypes.
3. A multi-period model
An obvious way to extend a single-period decision model is to generalize it to T
periods, where T is a positive integer.  In analyzing the implications of extra periods, two
polar situations can be distinguished: situations in which the choice of x can be changed at no
cost from period to period, and those in which it is fixed over the entire time horizon.  Both
polar situations will be analyzed in this section.  Both imply more attention to dynamic
efficiency than does the single-period benchmark, but for different reasons.
3.1. Assumptions
We maintain most of the assumptions of Section 2.1; the exceptions are made
explicit here.  The change process is now defined over T periods, as are its ingredients:
(11) qt = lqt - 1+(1- l )dt = l
tq + (1- l )å il
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9There are two additional differences. The first is that the organization’s priors about
the state of the world and the change factors are now assumed to be very diffuse. This means
that the relevant variances ( ) equal ∞ and implies that the organization will rely solely on
the information contained in the signals that it observes (as opposed to its prior beliefs).  The
assumption of very diffuse priors highlights the uncertainties that shroud choices about how
to organize.  It also spares us the complexities of fully Bayesian bookkeeping, without, we
believe, affecting the tenor of our results.
The second difference or, to be more precise, qualification concerns the choice of x.
Given optimization, the choice of x could be modeled in only one obvious way in the single-
period version of our model.  But with multiple periods, there are several modeling
possibilities.  The next subsection focuses its analysis, as mentioned above, on two extreme
possibilities: situations in which x can be changed in each period and those in which it is
fixed for T periods.  An additional restriction is imposed at the latter extreme by our
assumption that a commitment to a particular value of x for the rest of the time horizon must
be made in the first period. The possibility of delaying the commitment in order to secure
improved information is, unfortunately, ruled out as a result.
3.2. Analysis
We begin with the simpler of the two extreme possibilities, the situation in which the
choice of x can be changed from period to period.  It is easy to use the sort of analysis
developed in the previous section to show that the period-by-period optimization of x
involves comparison of , the absolute value of the ratio of the derivatives of the two
variances as in equation (8), with the following term:
. (12)
It is also easy to show that decreases as t, which indexes periods, increases
and, for any finite t, increases from 0 to  as  increases from 0 to 1.  By implication, as
time passes, the optimal choice of x or location on the efficiency frontier (x*) shifts toward
dynamic efficiency (toward 0).
The more complicated extreme possibility is that x is chosen in period 1 and fixed at
that level for the remaining (T-1) periods.  The problem then becomes one of choosing x to
minimize the following variance term:
(13)
The first-order conditions center on the derivative
(14)
and imply that the existence of interior as opposed to corner solutions for the value of x will
depend on the relation between and , where  F
T(l) z(x)
[l
2t ¢ v e(x)/t+(1- l )(1- l
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2t)va(x)/( 1+l)] (å t from t  =  1 to T) .(15a)
(15b)
Then the first-order conditions can be written as in the case of T = 1: 
(a)   If for all x [0,1] then x* = 0.
(b)   If  for all x  [0,1] then x* = 1.
(c)   Otherwise, there is an x*  (0,1) such that 
It is easy to show that increases from 0 to ∞ as increases from 0 to 1.
Since z(x) is the same function as before, the results are analogous to the T = 1 case. What is
of distinctive interest is how  changes in T.  It turns out that
(16)
for all  [0,1] and any T.  Furthermore, as T goes to ∞ ,  collapses to a
discontinuous function which is zero for all  [0,1) and infinite for  = 1.
Figure 2 graphs  for different values of T with the same parameters (z = 0.5
and  = 1.5) that were used in Figure 1.  The critical values of  move to the right as T
increases.  The impact of the multi-period extension is, therefore, to favor dynamic efficiency
at the expense of static efficiency, but the interval for which x equals 1 does not vanish for
any finite T.  The tendency to “locate” at either extreme, i.e., to become oriented toward
either static or dynamic efficiency, is still valid for any T.  In the special case when z(x) is
constant for all x Î [0,1], both variances are linear functions of x and there is a critical value
for each such that for any and for any 
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The predictions that attention to dynamic efficiency ought to be enhanced by
increases in t or T are not entirely intuitive: the former, for instance, is at odds with the idea
that organizations place progressively more emphasis on static efficiency as time passes (e.g.,
Abernathy and Utterback [1978]). The predictions therefore deserve further discussion.
The case in which the choice of x can be changed from period to period is relatively
simple to discuss as well as analyze.  Consider what happens to the choice of a strategy
oriented toward static efficiency (x = 1) in such a situation.  As time passes (t increases),
much is learned about the initial state of the world, but the actual state of the world also tends
to drift away from the estimated initial state.  Within the framework of our model, the only
optimizing response is to place more emphasis on dynamic efficiency as time passes.  It
would be useful to develop a more general model in which it is also possible to “refocus” by
setting the clock back to t = 0: to reset the initial state without changing the organization’s
location on the (static versus dynamic) efficiency frontier.  If refocusing is not too costly, that
should increase the intertemporal viability of static efficiency relative to the model analyzed
in the previous subsection.
The more complicated and, we believe, more important case concerns the situation
in which x is constrained to the same value in all T periods. With x fixed, increases in T
increase the implied degree of emphasis on dynamic efficiency. It is helpful, in this context,
to interpret T as the organizational lag in implementing a new efficiency orientation
(relocating to a rather different point on the efficiency frontier) rather than as a time horizon.
The question then becomes why such lags should be assumed: why the choice of an
efficiency orientation should involve significant commitment or irreversibility (Ghemawat
[1991]).
The most obvious answer is that that is what the empirical evidence appears to
indicate.  Organizational arrangements usually do not change much each day, month or even
year, and radical changes usually involve several organizational elements instead of being
made piecemeal, element by element (e.g., Miller and Friesen [1984]).  Radical
organizational changes, such as changes in efficiency orientation, therefore tend to be
relatively rare events separated by long intervals of time.
For a deeper answer, however, one must look at causal mechanisms rather than
behavior.  From an information-processing perspective, perhaps the most salient reason for
the sluggishness of change between the two efficiency orientations is the one suggested by
Arrow ([1974], p. 41). He focuses on the costs sunk into processing information in particular
ways:
“Once the investment has been made and an information channel acquired, it
will be cheaper to keep on using it than to invest in new channels, especially
since the scarcity of the individual as an input, already alluded to, implies
that the use of new channels will diminish the product of old ones.  Thus, it
will be difficult to reverse an initial commitment in the direction in which
information is gathered.” 
A second reason, rooted in a more competitive perspective, focuses on the
opportunity costs of the path not taken rather than on sunk costs: on lock-out as opposed to
lock-in.  Organizations can be pictured as racing against competitors to build up superior
capabilities along particular dimensions and dropping out of a particular race if they fall too
far behind. The two different efficiency orientations develop very different sorts
of capabilities over time: an emphasis of static efficiency builds functional, economizing
13capabilities while an emphasis of dynamic efficiency builds the capabilities required to
change products or processes.  To the extent that an emphasis on static efficiency retards
efficiency in dynamic terms, or vice versa, a competitor that initially bets on one orientation,
and loses, may be deterred from switching to the other by the prospect of being too far
behind.  Or to paraphrase Arrow ([1974], p. 41), even if the difference between the values of
the two possible efficiency orientations and the associated capabilities was initially expected
to be small and even if subsequent information suggests that the initial choice between the
two was wrong, it may not pay to reverse that decision later on.
A third reason focuses on the people within an organization and emphasizes the
difficulty rather than the undesirability of change. The two efficiency orientations would
appear to attract rather different sets of employees, making it hard to reverse an initial choice
of orientation without replacing many of them. Table 2 illustrates this point by contrasting
employee behavioral profiles assembled by Schuler and Jackson [1989].4 The differences are
so stark that one might even argue that the two efficiency orientations lead to very different
organizational cultures. Such socially complex resources are notoriously difficult to manage
systematically (Barney [1991]).
Table 2. Employee behavior profiles
Static-efficient behavioral profile Dynamic-efficient behavioral profile
Relatively repetitive and predictable behavior High degree of creative behavior
Rather short-term focus A longer-term focus
Primarily autonomous or individual activity High level of cooperative, interdependent behavior
Low risk-taking activity A greater degree of risk-taking
High degree of comfort with stability A high tolerance of ambiguity and unpredictability
Source:  Adapted from Schuler and Jackson [1989].
A final reason for commitments to particular ways of organizing focuses on the
behavioral bases of choice and the inertial tendencies built into them. To begin at the micro
level, consider the bases of individual choice depicted in Figure 3. It should be obvious how
inactivity and routines tend to induce inertia.  Principles, defined here as binding constraints
that supersede cost-benefit calculations, will have the same effect to the extent that they are
fixed.  Finally, psychological experiments suggest that even when choice is calculated, it may
be biased in ways that compound the economic sources of commitment discussed above.  In
particular, the sunk cost fallacy may reinforce lock-in into particular information channels,
and the lack of vividness of the path not taken may exacerbate the effects of lock-out from
the set of capabilities needed to pursue a different efficiency orientation. Organizational
theory also specifies a number of reasons why these micro sources of behavioral commitment
might be expected to coalesce into more macro ones. Two that are particularly interesting
from the standpoint of learning are defensiveness (Argyris [1990]) and group thinking (Janis
and Mann [1977]).
14Figure 3. The behavioral basis of choice
Source:  Ghemawat [1991].
For these (overlapping) reasons, we think that it is realistic to assume that the choice
of x is fixed over intervals of significant duration.  As demonstrated above, such fixity or
commitment increases the amount of attention that should be paid to dynamic efficiency
relative to the single-period benchmark.  The idea is that when x itself is fixed, the sort of
flexibility afforded by dynamic efficiency becomes more valuable.
4. Performance hypotheses
The previous two sections focused on theoretical models.This section turns to
empirical matters.  While it does not serve up any measurements, it supplies testable
hypotheses about systematic influences on the comparative performance of orientations
toward static versus dynamic efficiency. The hypotheses highlight the influence of basic
industry conditions and strategic choices on the relative profitability of the two efficiency
orientations.  The discussion is organized in terms of three basic dimensions: industry
attributes, business strategy and corporate strategy.
The associations are expected, along each of these dimensions, to be noisy because
organizational arrangements are conditioned by historical influences (or what Bartlett and
Ghoshal [1989] term administrative heritage) as well as by the incentive effects of
environmental contingency and strategic choice. The divergence between actual
organizational arrangements and those that would be optimal is likely to be greatest when
period-by-period optimization of organizational arrangements is infeasible, i.e., when there
are significant precommitments that induce inertia.  Some of the micro sources of inertia
were discussed at the end of the last section. Numerous macro organizational factors have
also been flagged as suspects: size, longevity, maturity, complexity, decentralization,
bureaucratization, and (top) management continuity.  There seem to be feedback effects from










BEHAVIOR PASSIVEperformance seems more likely to induce greater inertia. A full-blown treatment of
organizational inertia is beyond the scope of this section. It focuses, instead, on how the
organization’s industry environment(s) and its strategy are likely to influence its incentives to
adopt one efficiency orientation as opposed to another. The treatment is, of necessity,
tentative.
4.1. Industry attributes
The models developed earlier in this paper prove particularly helpful in highlighting
the possible influences of industry-level attributes on optimal efficiency orientations. The
influences are all moderated by  , which represents the sort of environmental uncertainty
that Lawrence and Lorsch [1967] emphasized in their classic treatment of the organization’s
relationship to its environment.  We aim to build on their work by proposing more specific
criteria that determine whether a particular industry is more likely to emphasize static or
dynamic efficiency.
It is useful to begin by reminding ourselves that low values of  , or high rates of
environmental change, tend to imply low values of x*, i.e., an emphasis on dynamic
efficiency.  Industry attributes that are positively (negatively) correlated with environmental
dynamism should therefore tilt organizations toward dynamic (static) efficiency orientations.
Several overlapping indicators of industry dynamism can be identified. First, industries that
exhibit high investment-intensities are likely to offer participants rich opportunity sets,
expanding the scope for dynamism.  This appears to be especially true of industries in which
investment is weighted toward intangible resources, such as knowledge or relationships,
rather than tangible resources such as physical capacity (Collis and Ghemawat [1993]). A
second indicator of industry dynamism is the rate at which its key resources depreciate. Other
things being equal, industries in which key resources (other than organizational
arrangements, which are a sort of meta-resource) are relatively long-lived should imply more
emphasis on static efficiency so as to ensure efficient utilization of the assets in place, and
those in which key resources have relatively short lives more emphasis on dynamic
efficiency.  A third indicator of dynamism is the rate at which an industry’s real prices,
adjusted for changes in quality, are declining.  If average real prices are stagnant (or
increasing), the emphasis is likely to fall on static efficiency; if they are decreasing by more
than a threshold rate (2 to 8 percent per year according to Williams [1992]), the emphasis is
likely to be on dynamic efficiency. 
A second set of industry-level influences on efficiency orientation pertains to changes
in    over time, as opposed to its level, which has so far been assumed to be fixed. Tot the
extent that industries proceed through life cycles during which  declines monotonically,
one should expect to see more attention to dynamic efficiency early on and to static
efficiency later (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback [1978]). More recent research reminds us,
however, that change need not be monotonic: that  may, for instance, increase sharply after
a long period of gradual decline (e.g., Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow [1984]; Baden Fuller
and Stopford [1992]).  Such “dematuring” shocks are likely to lead to a shift in emphasis,
from static efficiency toward dynamic efficiency. 
A third set of industry-level influences on efficiency orientation are related to the
continuity or discontinuity of change dynamics. Some industries are driven by a relatively
continuous dynamic which effectively enhances or at least preserves existing resources






16renders them obsolescent (Tushman and Anderson [1986]). Continuous changes should
promote more emphasis on static efficiency whereas discontinuous changes should lead to
more of an emphasis on dynamic efficiency if an organization adopts a strategy of trying to
compete effectively across discontinuities. But such organization-specific considerations lead
us into strategy. The rest of this section considers the implications of an organization’s
strategic choices for its optimal efficiency orientation.
4.2. Business Strategy
While industry-level attributes influence optimal organizational arrangements, they
do not determine them up to the point of isomorphism.  The reason is that there may be more
than one way to outperform the industry averages, implying an independent influence for
strategic choices at the business level –he level at which firm-specific and industry-specific
effects intersect– on optimal efficiency orientation.  In the context of our model, the pursuit
of a particular competitive position at the business unit level can be thought of as indirectly
influencing  by altering the character of competitive interactions.
One way of relating business strategy and efficiency orientation is in terms of the
two “generic” competitive strategies proposed by Porter [1980]: low cost and differentiation.
Table 1, which was originally intended to identify differences in the organizational
arrangements required to pursue these generic strategies, suggests that the pursuit of a low-
cost position goes hand in hand with an emphasis on static efficiency, and the pursuit of a
differentiated position with an emphasis on dynamic efficiency. An association between low-
cost strategies and the pursuit of static efficiency appears plausible to us, but we find it
helpful to unbundle differentiation strategies to distinguish between horizontal
differentiation, in which customers’ rankings of competing products depend on their tastes,
and vertical differentiation, in which customers’ rankings coincide (although their willingness
to pay for superior products may differ).  Strategies that involve vertical differentiation seem
to tie in most closely with the pursuit of dynamic efficiency, while strategies that involve
horizontal differentiation seem to be more of a mixed bag.
A second way to relate business strategy and efficiency orientation is to compare the
attributes of a particular business strategy with the industry-level aggregates discussed in the
previous subsection. Since industry aggregates are summed across competing businesses, a
significant correlation should be expected between industry-level and business-level
attributes. A match between them reinforces the previous subsection’s predictions about
organizational efficiency imperatives. Divergences can occur as well, however, and can be
predicted to have the obvious effects. For example, businesses whose strategies involve
relatively high rates of investment, of depreciation of key resources, or of improvements in
product performance/cost (the indicators of dynamism discussed in the previous subsection)
should be expected to place more emphasis on dynamic efficiency than their median
competitors. Their strategies can be thought of as decreasing the  s that they face relative to
the averages for their respective industries.
A third distinction that is of interest is between business strategies that emphasize
incremental improvements (e.g., the kaizen strategies popularly associated with Japanese
companies) and those that emphasize what, for lack of better terminology, we shall call big-
bang changes. While the prospects for these two types of business strategies obviously
depend on industry attributes, incremental strategies are likely (other things being equal) to





The discussion in this section has dwelled, so far, on industries and the businesses
that compete within them.  But economic activity in the most developed countries is
dominated by firms that compete in multiple industries.  In the United States, for instance,
Fortune 500 companies, which account for 40% of the gross national product, are each
active, on average, in 10 discrete lines of business (Collis and Montgomery [1991]). The
influence of corporate-level strategic choices on optimal efficiency orientation is also
therefore of interest.
It is useful to begin by noting that corporate-level considerations should be
superimposed on the predictions from the last two subsections: they do not supplant them.
The mere fact that the typical Fortune 500 company operates in 10+ competitive arenas does
not mean that it can afford to avoid paying detailed attention to each of them. There are at
least four reasons.  First, firm-level (i.e., corporate-level) effects on the performance of a
constituent business unit appear to be an order of magnitude smaller than effects evident at
the industry level or, on a stable basis, at the business unit level (Rumelt [1991]). Second,
important firm-specific resources tend to be specialized to particular industries or at least
types of industries that share common characteristics, implying that 10+ industry types can
usually be consolidated into a smaller number of industry “clusters” of greater individual
importance: in the United States, at least, there is considerable relatedness within the business
portfolio of the typical large, diversified corporation (Dosi, Teece and Winter [1990]).  Third,
even when a corporate portfolio spans industries that are heterogeneous rather than
homogeneous, grouping businesses by the types of industries in which they operate may
facilitate resource allocation, performance measurement, the optimal design of work
processes, et cetera.  Finally, if when an organization’s key resources are fungible, as in the
case of a pure conglomerate or a leveraged buy-out partnership, it will need to consider the
possibility of differentiating organizationally across the industries in which it operates in the
light of attributes specific to them or to its strategies within them.
The overlay effects of corporate strategy on optimal efficiency orientations can be
distinguished in terms of the extent to which the corporate headquarters is involved in
strategic planning (Goold and Campbell [1987]). A high level of corporate involvement
in strategic planning appears to constrain the extent to which businesses within the corporate
portfolio can effectively pursue different efficiency orientations.  At the limit, it implies that
all businesses within the corporate portfolio must have the same efficiency orientation,
making the choice of that orientation a corporate rather than business-level matter. A low
level of corporate involvement in planning, in contrast, expands the scope for different
efficiency orientations within a multi-business organization, although some impulses toward
uniformity continue to be imposed by the need for tight financial controls.5 At the limit,
when business-level efficiency orientations under the same corporate umbrella are entirely
independent of each other, the spotlight shifts away from corporate-level influences on
efficiency orientation and back toward influences that operate at the industry and business
levels.
5. Conclusions
To place this paper in broader perspective, we should point out that the tension
between static and dynamic efficiency seems to be central to strategy. To be specific, this
tension seems to be an essential element of current debates about the wisdom of pursuing the
18targeted competitive position (static efficiency) versus new visions of how to compete
(dynamic efficiency), or pursuing fit with the organization’s existing resources, capabilities or
strategy versus what Pascale [1991] refers to as transformation and Hamel and Prahalad
[1993] as stretch (both neologisms can be associated with dynamic efficiency).
Our analysis of the tension between static and dynamic efficiency demonstrates that
there is indeed an extremal logic to what might otherwise be dismissed as rhetorical
extremes. It also indicates that to the extent that the pace of change is accelerating ( is
decreasing) or organizational structures are proving more commitment-intensive than we
used to think (estimates of T are increasing), dynamic efficiency deserves more attention that
it was previously accorded.
Having said as much, we must close with the reminder that dynamic efficiency is not
a generic success factor or panacea. Industry structure and competitive strategy affect the
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency; so, in practice, does the firm’s history.
––––––––––––––––––
1 If both variances have the same slope in absolute terms, then z = 1 and the critical value is 1/2.
2 Several rows of Heskett’s original table have been omitted for various reasons, but it has not otherwise been
modified.
3 Porter [1980], for instance, recommends generic competitive strategies that involve achieving extreme
positions (lower costs or higher prices) and warns firms against getting “stuck in the middle.”
4 Schuler and Jackson [1989] actually focus on three distinct competitive strategies: innovation, quality-
enhancement and cost-reduction.  We have adapted Table 2 from their characterizations of the innovation
and cost-reduction strategies. The table omits factors they cite that are hard to translate into our two-way
classification.
5 According to Goold and Campbell [1987], a corporation is unlikely to add value to its component
businesses if it exerts neither planning nor control influences on them.
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